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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims at explaining the role and importance of the evolution of institutions for sustainable 
agri-environments during the transition process by referring to examples of agri-environmental prob-
lems faced in Central and Eastern European countries. It is often stated that the replacement of insti-
tutional structures in post socialist countries would bring a unique opportunity to implement new 
policies and institutions needed to ensure that economic growth is environmentally sustainable. This 
idea stems from the assumption that the breakdown of the socialist system resembles that (of the 
Schumpeterian1 type) of creative destruction – a process that incessantly revolutionizes economic 
structures from within. However, not all kinds of institutions, especially at local level, can simply be 
implemented, and even more, not incessantly. Instead, they evolve as a response to ecosystem and 
social system characteristics, and this is a rather slow process. A central question therefore is 
whether the required institutional arrangements for achieving sustainability in the area of agri-
environmental resource management can be built more easily in periods of transition as they fill 
institutional gaps, or whether processes of transition make institution building a more difficult and 
far more time consuming task than previously thought. Above all, we want to find out, how these 
two processes of institution building at different scales affect the sustainable management of re-
sources such as water and biodiversity in agriculture? It will become clear that the agri-
environmental problem areas faced during transition are complex and dynamic and require adequate 
institutions both by political design and from the grassroots, to be developed by the respective actors 
involved. Transition from centrally planned to pluralistic systems has to be considered as a particular 
and in some respect non-typical process of institutional change. Popular theories of institutional 
change do not necessarily apply. The privatisation experience from many CEE countries will serve 
as an example. Finally, we will provide some examples of missing or insufficient interaction be-
tween political actors or agencies and people in CEE countries. Substantial investments into social 
and human capital, particularly regarding informal institutions are needed for institutions of sustain-
ability to evolve.  
                                                 
1 Schumpeter (1942) 
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1 Institutions, Ecosystems and Sustainability – A Framework  
Institutions are sets of interrelated rules governing given aspects of social life which are 
acknowledged (or even sanctioned) by all or some members of society. Institutions 
regulate relationships among individuals and between social and the ecological system, 
i.e. rights and duties as well as costs and benefits of actions, and therefore institutions 
are the essential linkage between social and ecological systems (Goglio, 1997; Ostrom 
et al., 1993; Gatzweiler et al., 2001). In the following, a framework focussing on the 
interaction of social and ecological systems will be introduced. The notion of evolution 
and co-evolution refers to the characteristics of the process of (intentional) institution 
building or (non-intentional) institutional change as a process which is dynamic (i.e., it 
changes in time), complex and a result of co-adapting social and ecological systems. 
After a short description of the ecological system, the functions it provides for human 
use and the institutions which evolve as response, we will characterise the social and 
cultural system as being just as important for the evolution of institutions at the inter-
face of social and ecological systems.  
 
Nature is intrinsically interwoven with man’s institutions. To isolate man from nature or 
ecology from the economy is probably one of the weirdest undertakings of past and pre-
sent times (Polanyi, 1944). The destructive and sometimes catastrophic results of a 
mismatch between institutions and ecosystems or an absence of institutions is evident in 
many resource management problems which lack adequate coordinative response from 
the social systems. Often ‘natural catastrophes’ such as landslides or floods (Picture 1) 
are not as ‘natural’ as they may appear at first glance. Impacts and changes of the eco-
systems can lead to disasters which might have been prevented if better knowledge of 
the functions which ecosystems provide would have been available. Environmental me-
dia like water, soil and biodiversity are part of complex ecological cause-effect chains. 
Changes of these ecological patterns and its interlinkages are often unpredictable, espe-
cially in the long term. The predictability of ecological change is further complicated by 
the fact that the determinants of change are largely unknown and change over time.  
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Picture 1: Flood Along the Tisza River, Hungary/Ukraine 
Geographers believe that a significant factor in the worsening flooding is because of 
tree clearing in Ukraine in the catchment area of the upper Tisza. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MTI, Hungary 
 
Agriculture has traditionally been operating at the interface of social and ecological sys-
tems, and farmers have developed specialized skills to manage the environmental func-
tions provided by the ecosystem. Complexity and dynamics are also characteristics of 
social systems, and the predictability of social change is just as difficult as that of eco-
logical change. Particularly in economics, we are just beginning to understand that hu-
man behaviour is far more complex than merely rational and self-interest driven. Both 
the social and the ecological system are embedded in larger systems and also contain 
further systems on different scales. Ultimately, as information on system characteristics 
increases, the border line between human and ecological systems is less easy to define, 
and it becomes obvious that human and ecological systems are intrinsically interwoven. 
This is particularly true for agriculture. The story of the origins of agriculture is a story 
of development; and the story of development is a story of the victory of man against 
nature. Ever since the dominant understanding of development was to restrain and to 
maintain control over ecosystem complexity by the efficient use of some very few eco-
system functions. The institutional structures to facilitate the efficient exploitation were 
mainly built on private property regimes. After more than one century of fast technical 
progress and high economic growth, however, we need to concentrate our efforts on 
making use of ecosystem functions, instead of replacing/destroying them, in order not to 
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deprive future generations from benefiting from essential  functions of nature. This 
process reflects the co-evolution between social and ecological systems.  
 
In this context, our understanding of sustainability refers to the ways social systems 
interact with and relate to ecological systems by means of their institutions. Sustainable 
social or ecological systems are systems which can persist their integrity and functional-
ity over time, and this dynamic process is accompanied by the establishment of institu-
tions which facilitate co-adaptive change. A special attribute of sustainability is that 
both systems are interlinked and therefore need to sustain each other in order to sustain 
themselves. Ultimately this is a question of existence. Without ecology there is no econ-
omy, and without economy there is no existence (Hannon, 1997). From a biological 
point of view sustainability means that the resource avoids extinction. In economic 
terms it means that humans avoid major disruptions and can hedge against instabilities. 
Causes for the mismanagement of natural resources tend to be associated with absent 
institutions or with mismatches among institutions. Often institutions do not exist at the 
appropriate scale, or they are ineffective because they fail to control ecosystem stocks 
and flows properly. Other reasons for scale mismatches are ineffective decision making 
linkages or that decisions are based on information aggregated at the wrong scale, even 
though information at the appropriate scale may exist. There is considerable information 
on ecosystems at the small scale. However, large-scale systems are not simply small-
scale systems grown large. Management systems that work well in handling traditional 
resource problems at local level can produce destructive results when applied to global 
system scales. Similarly, if local resource management systems are superseded by na-
tional or international regulations, local ecosystems frequently suffer mismanagement 
(Costanza et al., 2001).  
 
The task of creating institutions of sustainability actively/intentionally or allowing for 
the creation of institutions passively/unintentionally means establishing compatibility 
between ecosystems and social systems by matching the requirements of ecosystem 
function management with adequate property rights regimes (rules) and appropriate 
governance structures (arrangements). This is because specific ecosystem characteristics 
require specific institutions to make use of the functions provided by the ecosystem and 
to protect it simultaneously from degradation or pollution. The network pattern of con-
Gatzweiler and Hagedorn – The Evolution of Institutions in Transition 
 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 7 
Discussion Paper 
nectivity within and between social and ecological systems plays an important role for 
designing institutions for sustainable resource use because it makes it difficult to arrive 
at the desired institutional structure. Only to a certain degree we are able to intentionally 
design both social and ecological systems due to the complexity of the desired out-
comes. Institutional framing conditions supporting and allowing for the evolution of 
local resource management institutions belong to this type of institutions which can 
(and should) be designed intentionally. However, as the nature of ecosystem 
characteristics is also stochastic and unpredictable (to a certain degree), the final match 
between ecosystem structures and appropriate governance structures will only occur, if 
at least some of these institutional innovations are given adequate scope of action to 
evolve spontaneously and unintentionally. Some institutions regulating human action 
evolve without conscious human design and maintain themselves without any formal 
‘machinery’ for enforcing them (Sugden, 1989). ‘People do things in a certain way 
because that’s what they have been always doing and it has proven to be the right way 
to do things’. The evolution of such institutions as a response to ecosystem specificity 
consists of processes of co-adaptation whereby structures are progressively modified to 
give better performance. These evolutionary processes of co-adaptation can only work 
along the lines of communication, information, feedback and response. For this proc-
esses of co-adaptation to be successful political actors should care for both reliable 
framing conditions by some basic rules and arrangements and sufficient scope for learn-
ing-by-doing and self-governance2. 
                                                 
2 The crux of the problem for the process of organisation, and institutional building is that initially actors 
at both the political and local level have incomplete information about which structures are appropriate. 
Initially, they do not have experience from similar situations in the past. To reduce this uncertainty, ob-
servation and explorative description are unavoidable. Learning from trial and error is unavoidable for 
this initial phase. Holling et al. (1996) who investigated the role of adaptation in social and ecological 
systems come to the grim conclusion that human systems of property rights built around deterministic 
ecosystem models are not flexible in their application or crafted in light of the temporal or special de-
mands of natural systems. Until modern human institutions are built on ecological dynamism, and de-
signed to flex with natural variability, their principle impact will be to impede nature, not to sustain it.  
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Fig. 1: Institutions are a Co-evolutionary Product of Interacting Social and 
Ecological Systems – A Framework for Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a consequence, institution building is a dynamic and complex process involving  
(1) the capital stocks in social and ecological systems (actors, human-made capital and 
natural capital such as biodiversity, water, etc.) and their characteristics,  
(2) the transactions and transformations3 between individuals or groups and between 
the social and ecological system and their characteristics,  
                                                 
3 Transactions are exchange relationships of material assets or information between actors of the social 
system and the ecological system. Transformations are physical changes of inputs into outputs, e.g. con-
sumption and production processes 
FG 
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(3) sets of rules, norms, property rights and regulations that control social and ecologi-
cal system behaviours (e.g., temperature controls in ecological systems, rules in so-
cial systems) and  
(4) the governance structures in which the rules are organised.  
Whereas (1) – (3) are features of both, social and ecological systems, (4) is an aggregate 
level of (3) and only occurs in social systems. The question now arises as to how such a 
rather general framework can be applied to concrete problems such as the evolution of 
institutions for agri-environmental sustainability.  
 
Table 1: The Logic of Institutional Change for Agri-environmental Co-ordination 
Interaction between 
nature and actors 
 Institutions of environ-
mental sustainability 
 
Properties of transactions 
 
 
 
Characteristics of actors 
Institutional Innovation 
 
 
Institutional Performance 
Property rights on ecosystem 
functions/ecological attributes 
 
 
Governance structures for 
agri-environmental relations 
 
 
 
2 Property Rights Regimes and Governance Structures for Agri-environmental 
Sustainablity 
Of course, institutions focussing on agri-environmental sustainability are a part of the 
system of ecological-economic co-evolution with mutual adjustment mechanisms. The 
forces driving their (non-intentional) evolution or the criteria relevant for their (inten-
tional) design can be derived from the framework developed above. Accordingly, insti-
tutional change regarding agri-environmental co-ordination, i.e. mainly the property 
rights regimes and governance structures in this area, can be understood as a response to 
technological, ecological and economic factors, on the one hand, and societal, behav-
ioural and political influences, on the other (Table 1). For structuring and analysing the 
relationships and the interplay between these factors, an explorative concept is neces-
sary. Institutional change in the area of resource protection and agri-environmental co-
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ordination is related on the following groups of phenomena (see, for a more compre-
hensive description, Hagedorn, 2000a; Hagedorn, et al., 2001a): 
 
(1) Which institutional arrangements arise, that depends on the features and implica-
tions of the transactions related to nature and the ecosystem (Box 1). This is 
mainly influenced by the physical properties and material transformations with 
which environmental goods and bads, benefits and damages are associated (exam-
ple: leaching of nitrates into the groundwater on sandy soils). Technological inno-
vation and structural change lead to permanent changes of these properties and 
transformations.  
(2) Simultaneously, institutional change depends on the characteristics and objectives 
of the actors involved (Box 2) in those transactions. This is not only true for indi-
vidual actors whose values, interests and resources to exert influence (power) are 
very different, but also for groups of individuals like communities using organisa-
tions and networks to shape institutions according to their objectives (example: 
farmers who cause nitrate leaching by high nitrogen fertilisation and unfavourable 
crop rotation without catch crops).  
 
(3) The changes in institutions, which result from the two main categories of driving 
forces mentioned above, affect the design and distribution of property rights on 
ecosystem functions (DeGroot, 1992) (Box 3), or more precisely, on those cost and 
benefit streams which can be attributed to natural capital and ecosystem services 
(example: trade-offs between reducing nitrogen balances by means of lower fertili-
sation and intercropping and decline in gross margins). The property rights can be 
defined for numerous ecological properties of a physical piece of nature, each of 
them related to particular costs and benefits (and for each of these differentiated 
rights components, the institutional design of the right or duty can differ: private, 
collective and state property regimes or open access). They tend to become more 
and more differentiated, because they do not only apply to physical goods like land, 
but also to various dimensions and many details of land use relevant to environ-
mental protection and sustainable agriculture, e.g., the right to decide on crop rota-
tion. 
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(4) Necessarily, such changes in property rights on nature components are accompa-
nied by corresponding changes in governance structures (Box 4), mainly for two 
reasons: first, property rights on nature components, like other property rights, 
must be supervised and sanctioned to become effective instead of only being for-
mal in nature; and secondly, the actors can only make use of their rights and enti-
tlements and will only fulfil their duties and obligations, if transactions are organ-
ised and co-ordinated (example: farmers will only comply with fertilising restric-
tions and cropping prescriptions if a adequately working system of measuring and 
monitoring activities, information and administration, positive and/or negative in-
centives, i.e. of subsidies and/or penalties, exists).  
Box 1: Features of Transactions Affecting the Natural Environment and Ecologi-
cal Systems 
(1) Excludability of actors from access to environmental goods and exclusion costs 
(2) Rivalry among the users of environmental, goods, i.e. “subtractability” in com-
mon-pool resources  
(3) Asset specificity induces opportunistic behaviour:  
site specificity, capital specificity, specific knowledge  
(4) Separability is often low due to jointness of production of environmental goods  
(5) Frequency of transactions: specialised governance structures, economies of 
scale and learning by doing  
(6) Uncertainty causes transaction costs for measuring and monitoring and gathering 
adequate information  
(7) Complexity, combined with insufficient scientific knowledge, provokes oppor-
tunistic behaviour  
(8) Heterogeneity and variability, i.e. “site and situation specificity” makes standard-
ised regulation inefficient 
(9) Legitimacy refers to compatibility with the normative views of the actors and 
groups concerned 
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(5) Similar to the property rights regimes mentioned above, governance structures are 
also very differentiated (markets, e.g., tradable pollution quotas, hierarchies such as 
environmental bureaucracies, hybrid forms like contractual relations, e.g., steward-
ship contracts, horizontal non-market co-ordination, i.e. co-operation and participa-
tion, knowledge and information systems, formal and informal networks, methods 
and infrastructure for measuring, monitoring and evaluating environmental dam-
ages and benefits, e.g., systems of laboratories, rules and procedures for conflict 
resolution, regulation of liability, incentives to promote innovation and learning, 
etc.). They may include self-organised co-ordination (e.g., environmental co-
operatives) and governmental regulations (e.g., environmental bureaucracies), and 
they are not only related to the implementation of environmental instruments, but 
also to decision making on environmental policies which takes place on the differ-
ent levels of co-operative federalism (community, region, province, national, EU, 
international).  
 
Box 2: Characteristics of Actors Involved in Agri-environmental Co-ordination 
(1) Values and beliefs of the actors and their particular attitudes and perceptions of
agri-environmental issues  
(2) Reputations for reliability and trustworthiness are important for the credibility
of their commitments  
(3) Resources for influencing agri-environmental strategies at the regional and lo-
cal levels, i.e. by direct participation  
(4) Resources for influencing political decision making at higher than the regional
level, in which land users cannot participate directly  
(5) Information and knowledge, and capacities for acquiring, processing, retain-
ing and using knowledge and information; asymmetric information  
(6) “Actor’s method of action selection”: maximising homines oeconomici, con-
strained maximisers with bounded rationality, or fallible learners  
(7) Social environment and embeddedness of actors in communities and cultures 
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For the last point mentioned above, the political economy behind the process of joint 
implementation and decision making in a federal system has to be taken into account. 
This may produce scale problems similar to those emphasised by Constanza et al. 
(2001): Self-interested or insufficiently informed political actors may be reluctant or 
unable to create missing linkages between scales and to gather information at appropri-
ate scales. 
 
For exploring and explaining these four groups of variables in more detail, we surely 
can make use of approaches like New Institutional Economics and the Institutional 
Analysis of Natural Resources (e.g., Richter and Furobotn, 1996; North, 1992; William-
son, 1996; Ostrom, 1990; 1998; 1999; Bromley, 1991; 1996; 1998; Loehmann and Kil-
gour, 1998; Berkes and Folke, 1998). Studies available on environmental co-operation 
and participation are available as an additional source of theoretical concepts and em-
pirical information (see, e.g., OECD, 1998; Bahner, 1996; Zimmer, 1991; 1994a,b; 
Campbell, 1998; Fisk, Hesterman and Thorborn; 1998; van Woerkum and Aarts, 1998; 
Woodhill and Roeling, 1998; and the contributions to the 64th EAAE Seminar published 
Box 3: Property Rights on Ecosystem Functions Related to Agriculture 
(1) Benefit streams or cost components connected with physical goods: differenti-
ated “property rights on nature components”  
(2) Property rights separately defined for numerous ecological properties of a 
physical piece of nature: private, collective, state property regimes, open access  
(3) Transaction costs for defining and establishing property rights can be prohibi-
tively high, but may change, for example, by technological progress  
(4) Structure of property rights: selecting the most efficient right holder, the “re-
sidual claimant”, deciding on control rights, “bundling of rights” or “divided 
property”  
(5) Bundling property rights on nature components favours decentralisation, divid-
ing rights results in centralisation and affects motivation and participation  
(6) Rights cannot be used and duties cannot be fulfilled in an isolated way in eco-
logical systems, rights and duties are conditional upon the use and fulfilment of 
other rights and duties respectively 
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Seminar published in Hagedorn, 2001b). However, detailed empirical research of this 
sort is still in an initial phase, and much has to be done: The number of characteristics 
of the human actor, features of transactions and types of rules affecting organisational 
arrangements which affect the capacity of human actors to manage environmental re-
sources is very large, and we are far from complete knowledge about these characteris-
tics and their effects. 
 
In spite of this, we can draw the conclusion that the property rights regimes and govern-
ance structures necessary for achieving sustainabilty will not be simple. As they need to 
evolve in response to the complex, diverse and dynamic nature of the characteristics of 
the social and ecological system, it appears logical that there can be no single type of 
rules, norms, rights and governance which would guarantee sustainable development. 
Bowels and Gintis (2000) support this view by stating that well-designed institutions 
make different governance structures (e.g., markets, states, communities and coopera-
tive structures) compliments, not substitutes.  
 
How can we adjust our research concepts to the fact that both property rights regimes 
and governance structures are in a process of change that makes them more complex 
and diverse? As far as governance structures are concerned, the concept of polycentric-
ity may contribute to an adequate solution. Polycentricity is created by those who par-
ticipate in it. It is an order which allows communities to organise different kinds of pub-
lic goods at different scales of aggregation with different and overlapping jurisdictions. 
It cannot be sustained unless the relevant actors make use of their full range of alterna-
tives. Polycentric order must be grounded in mutually supportive institutional arrange-
ments in the economic, legal, constitutional and political realms. Markets for private 
goods are needed to provide incentives for efficient production. The producers and pro-
viders of public goods and services must have some assurance that their efforts to pro-
vide those goods and services to various communities are legally and economically rec-
ognized.  
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For polycentric orders to operate there must be correspondence between the beneficiar-
ies of public goods and services and those who pay for/provide them (McGinnis, 1999). 
Polycentricity provides an ideal setting for the co-production and co-management of 
public goods and services by members of communities. It offers an alternative to the 
passive expectations people have towards political authorities. Polycentricity may be a 
helpful concept for solving the agri-environmental problems faced during transition as it 
enables to connect the loose ends of the requirements for sustainable agri-environments 
identified later in this paper. This means to establish a link between self-governance of 
Box 4: Governance Structures for Regional or Local Agri-environmental Co-
ordination 
“New Institutional Economics”:  
• Markets 
• Hierarchies 
• Hybrid forms 
“Institutions of Sustainability”: 
• Strategies to improve reflexivity  
• Self-organisation and participation  
• Interest harmonisation and conflict regulation 
• Concepts for innovation and learning 
“Agri-environmental governance structures”: 
(1) Market solutions like auctions or tradable quotas 
(2) Organisations like environmental bureaucracies 
(3) Contractual relations, e.g. stewardship contracts 
(4) Horizontal non-market co-ordination, particularly co-operation and
participation  
(5) Knowledge and information systems, formal and informal networks 
(6) Methods and infrastructure for measuring, monitoring and evaluation, e.g.
laboratories 
(7) Rules and procedures for conflict resolution, distribution of costs and benefits,
liability 
(8) Incentives and opportunities to promote innovation and learning, establishing a
knowledge system 
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citizens and their decentralised institutional choice to the decision-making procedures 
and implementation capacities of national and EU policy makers. 
 
3 Particularities of Institutional Change in Transition Countries 
As a matter of fact, the process of institution building for sustainable resource use is 
affected by the particular procedures and problems arising from the process of trans-
forming the political and economic system. Findings from in three CEE Countries pre-
sented by the KATO privatisation studies (Milczarek, 2000; Hanisch, 2000; Schlüter, 
2000) have led to the following results (see also Hagedorn, 2000b): 
 
1. “Efficiency and competition” as compared to “distribution and conflict resolution” 
and “ideology and mental models” are not the main driving forces of privatisation.  
2. The process of privatisation should no longer be conceived of as “privatisation” ac-
cording to its theoretical understanding as establishing merely private property 
rights.  
3. Shared mental models, innovation concepts, learning processes and access to net-
works, to human and to social capital are important mechanisms for institutional 
change.  
 
Efficiency could be a driving force of privatisation, because this does not necessarily 
mean inventing new institutions but just implementing a transfer of institutions. As a 
consequence, the Theory of Exchange and Competitive Selection as an efficiency-
oriented explanation for institutional change might be applicable (Knight, 1992: 106). 
This approach includes competitive pressure as a selection mechanism for efficient in-
stitutions. However, the KATO privatisation studies (Milczarek, 2000; Hanisch, 2000; 
Schlüter, 2000) provide only little support for this approach. In contrast, the Theory of 
Bargaining and Distribution considers social institutions “as a by-product of strategic 
conflict over substantive social outcomes” (Knight, 1992: 107). As pointed out in detail 
by Hanisch (2000) and Schlüter (2000), this theory focuses on social interaction be-
tween actors seeking to achieve their distributional objectives. This is influenced by 
resource asymmetries of actors, credibility of their commitment, individual risk aver-
sion, time preferences, etc. This approach has primarily been applied to decentralised 
institutional change, but most of its components also seem to be relevant to institutions 
which are centrally designed and are also treated by the Public Choice Theory of Institu-
tional Change (Weimer, 1997; Hagedorn, 1991; 1996a,b; 1999). 
 
Gatzweiler and Hagedorn – The Evolution of Institutions in Transition 
 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 17 
Discussion Paper 
However, these observations also show that the process of privatisation driven by the 
desire of groups of actors having unequal power resources to appropriate “a piece of the 
cake” often took place in a way that cannot be considered “efficient” for society. This 
contradicts a conception popular in economics that associates efficiency with private 
property rights and analogously suggests that “privatisation” in the sense of merely es-
tablishing private property rights is equivalent to increasing efficiency.  
 
Property rights theory is often misunderstood as an approach explaining the definition 
and distribution of disposition rights focussing on physical entities (Hagedorn, 2000a; 
Hagedorn et al., 2001a). Strictly speaking, actors only attribute (positive or negative) 
values to a physical good because the right holder is favoured by benefit streams or in 
case of a duty is burdened by cost components which are connected with the physical 
good. A natural good, like soil, is usually considered to carry only one homogeneous 
property title. However, categories of property rights can be separately defined for nu-
merous economic or ecological properties connected with the physical piece of nature, 
each of them related to particular costs and benefits. For each of these differentiated 
rights components, the institutional design of the right or duty can differ: private, col-
lective and state property regimes are imaginable (or others, more differentiated ones), 
and also the absence of property rights definition and delineation in the sense of open 
access (Bromley, 1991; Ostrom, 1990). In addition, property rights on such attributes of 
natural or physical capital require adequate governance structures, because they must be 
supervised and sanctioned to become effective instead of only remaining formal in na-
ture.  
 
In other words, concepts of privatisation are only complete and consistent if  
• all main attributes of a physical or natural object are subjected either to private 
property rights or other property rights regimes (or combinations) if these are su-
perior, and if 
• governance structures covering each component of this bundle of rights are de-
veloped, not neglecting the required societal, political and administrative struc-
tures for decision making, participation and implementation. 
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The KATO privatisation studies (Milczarek, 2000; Hanisch, 2000; Schlüter, 2000) pro-
vide many examples for the problems which arise if decision makers follow the above-
mentioned misconception of privatisation neglecting property rights regimes and gov-
ernance structures that are not private. For example, in the Czech Republic private 
farmers are sanctioned in order to keep their competitiveness and their reputation on the 
land market low, in Bulgaria land, machine services and the processing industry is mo-
nopolised by some actors, and the social situation of former state farm workers in Po-
land deteriorated. The nature of this problem may be even better illustrated by the ex-
perience that privatisation concepts usually neglect environmental protection and eco-
logical sustainability (Lütteken and Hagedorn, 1999). Exploitation of soil fertility and 
destruction of irrigation equipment as well as degradation of drainage systems during 
the process of restitution, privatising large livestock units without regulating pollution 
by manure, etc. show that property rights on nature attributes or ecosystem functions 
and corresponding governance structures are given low priority in institutional reforms.  
 
When the centrally planned economies collapsed, the shared mental models which had 
been developed during the socialist system could no longer fulfil its tasks. Individuals 
and groups depend on meaningful mental models for the purpose of reducing complex-
ity (North, 1990: 24). As a consequence, people were seeking for new cognitive sche-
mata to understand and to explain the world which had changed very much for them. In 
particular at the beginning of the transformation period, when the system in transition 
was characterized by a high degree of insecurity, reduction of complexity was urgently 
needed. Since this basic function of shared mental models is of major relevance in this 
confusing situation, ideologies have played an important role in transition countries. 
Although in early stages of the transformation process society as a whole may not have 
arrived at sufficiently stable shared mental models yet, they may already exist within 
certain groups, which then can make use of their common understanding of problems 
for lowering transaction costs of decision making and for facilitating achievement of 
their particular group objectives. As communication and consensus building is easier 
and requires less resources within such groups, they become more powerful than others. 
Another source of gaining power in the privatisation process was the ability of some 
actors to shape people’s shared mental models in the bargaining process regarding new 
institutional arrangements.  
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The above-mentioned privatisation studies have shown that there obviously is a variety 
of institutional choices for problems of institutional change in general and for transition 
in particular. However, if actors and groups do not know about the solutions, lack crea-
tivity for finding them, do not have sufficient resources to develop and to discuss inno-
vations, cannot communicate new institutional concepts in order to arrive at joint con-
ceptions of the problems, and are not able to organise collective action and participation 
of stakeholders, then the pure fact that such solutions might exist is of little practical 
use. Collective learning processes combined with the evolution of new shared mental 
models seem to play a fundamental role for institutional innovation. 
 
The empirical evidence from privatisation in post socialist countries mentioned in the 
previous paragraphs, e.g., the misconception of what ‘privatisation’ should be, show the 
importance of the wider social context of property regulations. There is particular evi-
dence of what Hann (2000) calls the ‘tragedy of the privates’ in post-socialist countries 
privatisation was often carried out under consultation of Western advisers with a rather 
narrow economic understanding of private property and with a strategy of ‘privatise 
now and then let market competition prevail’. Neo-liberalism and privatisation have 
been prominent in the recipes offered to the ex-socialist countries. This ethnocentric 
understanding of property relations (the ‘European dichotomy’, either private or collec-
tive) continues to dominate popular academic thinking about property in the ages of the 
cold war and after the collapse of the Soviet Union4 (Hann, 2000).  
 
How helpful is this ‘mental model’ of privatisation in explaining the new social patterns 
of the first post-socialist decade? Probably it played an important role shortly after the 
collapse of the centrally planned economies for reducing insecurity and uncertainty but 
presumably it does not help very much. In their contrasting ways, the simplifications of 
the liberal models (privileging economic performance and private ownership) and the 
socialist models (privileging politic, social justice and collective ownership) cannot do 
justice to the actually prevailing complexity and social, legal, political and economical 
                                                 
4 Engels (1884) emphasises the importance of an evolutionist approach to property. 
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embeddedness of property relations in all social systems5. Studying the change of insti-
tutions in countries in transition must therefore include the enhanced rights and entitle-
ments of not only private, but all types of property rights regimes in these wider do-
mains. The same applies to the heterogeneity of governance structures6.  
 
For these reasons, regardless the framing conditions of the political system, govern-
ments should provide sufficient scope of action and adequate incentives for institutional 
diversity to evolve instead of imposing organisational structures which may not match 
local circumstances, because the diversity of ecological functions, which require a very 
specific response from the people involved, are not adequately predictable at other lev-
els of society than at the local level. This does not mean that institution building for 
sustainable resource use can evolve without favourable framing conditions at the policy 
level. However, transition and accession policies too often neglect the potentials of in-
stitutions outside of state bureaucracy (e.g., networks, cooperatives, new forms of asso-
ciations, mechanisms of learning, monitoring and communication). If successful strate-
gies are to be put into practice, political instruments will hardly be adequate and useful 
if the institutional choices made by the people are overlooked (Hagedorn, 2001a; Hage-
dorn et al., 2001b). 
 
4 Special Problems of Building Institutions of Sustainability in Transition Coun-
tries 
The previous sections have given some explanations why institutional innovation to-
wards sustainability is a very special, complex and not completely predictable process 
(section 2), and that the fundamental institutional changes taking place in the transition 
countries also have its own particularities (section 3). As a consequence, the question 
arises as to what happens if we want to achieve both simultaneously. Is it reasonable to 
                                                 
5 History provides evidence that even the most socialist countries did not disturb individual rights over 
many items of individual property and most extreme neo-liberal regimes depend heavily on a set of con-
ditions maintained by the state. 
6 Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (1999) offer an analytical framework which distin-
guishes different dimensions of social organisation at which property relations can be studied: cultural 
and ideological (1), normative and institutional regulations (2), social property relations (3), and social 
practices (4).   
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organise such a “double transformation” at the same time? Let us assume that it is feasi-
ble provided that we take into account the following problems that are likely to arise: 
• In the transformation situation, the actors, e.g., farm managers or agricultural bu-
reaucrats, seek opportunities to secure their living and to prepare for a new or con-
tinued carrier. To achieve this objective, acquisition of private property rights which 
provide access to high individual benefits from entitlements and cause only low 
costs from duties is given priority. Privatised land, machines or cattle belong to this 
category of assets powerful actors aim at and are able to appropriate, as pointed out 
in the previous section. In other words, there is a high incentive intensity for institu-
tional change regarding the distribution of private property rights. 
• The next aspect refers to the effectiveness of property rights. Developing appropriate 
governance structures for the profitable use of private property rights is in many 
cases easier than it is for non-private property rights. Admittedly, establishing mar-
kets, e.g., for meat or vegetables, requires considerable innovation and investment, 
for example, in marketing cooperatives and processing factories, but this is driven 
by private interests.  
• In contrast, governance structures for making effective non-private property rights 
related to sustainable resource use and agri-environmental sustainability is much 
more difficult and costly. The first, general reason for this is that the political and 
administrative system is in a stage of fundamental reform7 and still has to develop 
those capacities of decision making and implementation which democratic societies 
need to work properly. Secondly, and this may be even more important, these gov-
ernance structures are every costly in terms of social capital (e.g., for consensus 
building), human capital (e.g., for sustainable farming practices), and physical capi-
tal (e.g., for building laboratories to control environmental standards). Probably, 
these investments in all three types of capital imply a large proportion of dedicated 
assets with a high degree of specificity. 
• Due to these obstacles of implementation and enforcement, including requirements 
such as monitoring, information, communication, participation, etc., the incentive 
intensity for non-private property rights is much lower than for private property 
rights which are more attractive because they will be more or sooner effective in the 
transition phase. However, there is a second reason for this. Property rights on eco-
logical attributes of the nature components are often duties causing negative income 
effects, for example, if nitrogen inputs have to be reduced. People in transition coun-
tries whose income are often low (and sometimes have even declined in the nine-
teenth) refuse to accept this, and limited state budgets do not allow for paying com-
pensation for income losses from environmental measures. 
• In addition, it appears not only less attractive, but also less necessary to care for in-
stitutions of sustainability in the transition period. After 1990, the abolition of input 
subsidies and the drop of demand for agricultural products (domestic and external) 
resulted in an unfavourable ratio of input and output prices. As a consequence, both 
the use of chemical inputs and the production output were declining. Thus, the po-
litical changes in 1989/90 and the collapse of the economy reduced the pressure on 
                                                 
7 This may offer some ‘windows of opportunity’ for environmental and conservation policies (for exam-
ple, in Eastern Germany government and parliament agreed on new and rather large nature conservation 
areas which would not have been accepted in regular times). However, such phenomena were rather 
limited.  
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the environment and gave nature a “chance to rest”.  However, the low use of poten-
tially harmful inputs also reduces the motivation to design institutions and policies 
for sustainability. After  agriculture will have been restructured, the level of input 
use is likely to increase again leading to growing environmental pollution. In other 
words, rules for sustainability and corresponding environmental policies appear to 
be unnecessary in the short run, although they will be urgently needed in the long 
run. They may find themselves in a “transformation trap”. After the main period of 
institutional innovation has passed, it may be very difficult to change the rules and 
arrangements again in favour of sustainability. 
• The importance of this lack of motivation may be reinforced by the fact that the 
preferences of people and politicians are not very much oriented towards environ-
mental protection and sustainable resource use. They simply ‘have other problems’ 
in the difficult phase of transition such as low incomes, declining social security, 
lack of political stability, threats to social peace, ethnic unrest, etc. 
• Since environmental protection was not given high priority in socialist societies, 
values and attitudes are not primarily oriented towards sustainability. The cognitive 
schemata or mental models of citizens and politicians are still in a process of inte-
grating these aspects. The same is true for the knowledge system. Given the out-
standing relevance of cognitive schemata or mental models for real institutional 
change, as substantiated by the results of the above-mentioned KATO Studies, this 
may be one of the most important obstacle against institutional change towards sus-
tainability. 
 
Finally, former communist economic and political systems usually have a deficit re-
garding decentralisation and participation. Many systems such as irrigation organisa-
tions were highly centralized and have to undergo fundamental transformation towards 
polycentricity. Similarly, the autocratic political design of the communist governments 
tried to avoid people’s free participation in public affairs, what requires a process of 
learning and reorientation as an essential part of reform in those societies. Filling these 
gaps is particularly important for institutions of sustainability, because in the process of 
co-evolution mutual adjustment of ecological and social systems and the special proper-
ties of ecological systems require sufficient flexibility and scope for trial and error, as 
pointed out in section 1. This requires accumulation of social capital.  
 
5 Social Capital and Public Participation in Transition Countries 
Social capital, in contrast to natural capital, belongs to the category of human-made 
capital – capital which is created by conscious effort and for which time is spent now, to 
increase productivity later.  
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Human-made capital can be divided into physical, human and social capital (Ostrom, 
2001). Institutions evolve from human interactions and their efforts to organise social 
life and the relations between social and ecological systems. The economy consists of 
many institutions (from which the market is only one) and each are specific for the pur-
pose they serve.  
Figure 2: Social Capital is Part of Human-Made Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to a report published by Lang and Serban (2000), a majority of people in 
Romania, Hungary and Macedonia are quite aware of environmental problems in their 
countries and they perceive air, water and soil pollution as main problem areas, also in 
agriculture. Box 5 gives some examples of agri-environmental problems and institutions 
in transition countries as documented by researchers of the CEESA Project. It is evi-
dent that environmental problems are a matter of public concern, and people in CEECs 
are willing to invest into the quality of future environments even at the expense of pre-
sent wealth. There can be no doubt about the existence of social capital in transition 
countries, but examples show that institutions to effectively solve conflicts, e.g., land 
tenure and property rights problems, are still lacking (Abele et al., 2001). This lack of 
Human- Made Capital 
Physical 
Stock of material resources which produces a flow of future income 
benefiting some and may harm others, creating opportunities, constrain-
ing events 
Social 
Stock of shared understandings, norms, rules and expectations that 
groups bring to a recurrent activity which produces a flow of future in-
come benefiting some and may harm others, creating opportunities, con-
straining events 
Human 
Stock of acquired individual knowledge and skills which produces a 
flow of future income benefiting some and may harm others, creating 
opportunities, constraining events 
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institutions is partly reflected in the expectations people have towards EU accession. 
Among several expectations and hopes linked to accession, people hope for stricter 
rules in the area of environmental protection. At the same time, confusion seems to exist 
regarding the form of governance of these rules. Whereas Hungarians and Macedonians 
are convinced that NGOs are the most efficient organisational structure for solving envi-
ronmental problems, Romanians think that local governments are the best organisational 
and institutional solution to environmental problems. 
 
As already pointed out in section 3, dimensions of social and cultural capital were also 
important for the conversion from collective to private farming during transition. What 
mattered for those who wanted to farm privately was access to machinery and contacts 
with markets, to suppliers, purchasers and bankers. Those who were in the position of 
strength to become commercial private farmers in post socialist villages had the ade-
quate knowledge and good business contacts partially inherited from socialism. Suc-
cessful private farm operators,  of both private corporate farms and large-scale private 
family farms, were often socialist sector manager before 1990, because they had the 
necessary social and cultural capital skills to make a success of private farming (see 
Milczarek, 2000; Hanisch, 2000; Schlüter, 2000, i.e. the KATO privatisation studies 
mentioned in section 3, and also Swain, 2000). 
 
The establishment of political instruments and the redistribution of rights and arrange-
ments (e.g., privatisation and the legal framework) alone cannot solve the major envi-
ronmental problems in agriculture. Responsibilities and duties are connected to rights 
and rules which are needed to effectively control and monitor. Confusion exists over the 
question at which level and scale these responsibilities should be located. Confusion 
exists also over the question of optimal institutional design patterns for solving envi-
ronmental problems. This may partly be explained by a gap between legislation and 
practice, but a lack of experience in public participation could be another important 
reason. This assumption is underlined by the view of people in CEECs that national 
governments are spending too little effort on environmental protection, and the expecta-
tion that EU accession will bring stricter environmental rules. At the same time, there is 
disagreement about the level at which these responsibilities should be located (local, 
regional, national governments, or NGOs) (REC, 1998). 
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Public participation requires a legal framework. The basic rights which are relevant to 
public participation include the right of access to information, the right of free expres-
sion, association and assembly, and the right to petition the government. In the early 
1990s, most CEE countries established new constitutions, and these fundamental rights 
were granted in all CEE countries. Despite these rights and general provisions of public 
participation, there remains a gap between the legislative framework and the practice of 
public participation. This is especially evident in respect to procedures to facilitate pub-
lic involvement in law- and rulemaking and in the drafting of policies, programs and 
plans at the national and local levels (REC, 1998). 
 
Bridging the gap between politics and people and matching procedural and operational 
rules in use at the farming systems level with government policies requires answers to 
essential questions, such as: 
1. Based on which (alternative) property rights regimes and governance structures do 
improved policy instruments need to be suggested?  
2. Which enforcement, implementation, control, and monitoring mechanisms are ade-
quate? 
3. What are the opportunities for new institutions such as environmental cooperatives 
and learning by networks to come into being?  
4. Which negative environmental impacts could be caused by a lack of institutions at 
different levels?  
5. Which power constellations at the central and at the local levels influence institu-
tional rules and arrangements? 
6. Which economic incentives for nature preserving farming practices are required? 
7. What measures at the farm level are adequate to improve sustainability? 
8. Which trade-offs between ecological and economic goals can be expected? 
9. Which adjustment problems are the farms facing regarding conversion to sustain-
able farming practices? 
10. How do these interact with other adjustment problems which are, e.g., due to struc-
tural change and out-migration?  
11. Which transaction costs occur at farm level from the necessity of measuring and 
monitoring agri-environmental impacts? 
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Box 5: Agri-environmental Problems and Institutions in Countries in Transition 
Bulgaria: The amount of water used for irrigation in the Plovdiv region has declined sharply 
over the past decade. The decline has been attributed to the general decline in agricultural produc-
tion and decollectivisation. Decollectivisation has led to uncertainty about the organisations in 
charge of managing local-level irrigation works, which remained under communal property. De-
collectivisation has also implied that the state-owned irrigation company deals with a large num-
ber and different types of agricultural producers, instead of the agricultural cooperatives in the 
past. As a consequence, irrigation canals were not maintained and deteriorated, the amount and 
efficiency of water use declined precipitously, and cropping structures underwent drastic changes. 
 
Czech Republic: Bílé Karpaty has been declared a nature conservation area for its valuable habi-
tats and species diversity. The designation involves restrictions on farming practices that are per-
ceived as detrimental to biodiversity. The goal of protection has conflicted with agricultural pro-
duction in two ways. First, unclear property rights have led to land abandonment in less fertile 
areas. Secondly, privatisation and expanding markets have motivated farmers to intensify cultiva-
tion on more fertile lands. The administration of Bílé Karpaty Protected Landscape Area has 
faced problems in an increasingly pluralistic society to enforce legally mandated restrictions on 
farming practices and moved from a hierarchical towards a more cooperative way to deal with 
local land users. 
 
Latvia: Soil fertility has declined and the area of abandoned land has increased in Latvia over the 
past decade. Reduced liming has led to the acidification of agricultural soils. The decline of 
drainage systems maintenance has led to the destruction of drainage systems and disturbed soil 
moisture conditions. The deterioration of soil fertility has been associated with a general decrease 
in agricultural production and a shift from state and collective enterprises to small-scale and sub-
sistence farming. As a consequence of privatisation, the farm structure has become increasingly 
fragmented, agricultural land abandonment has increased, and local-level drainage works have 
not been maintained properly. 
 
Poland: Agricultural land has rapidly shrunk in the surroundings of Warsawa and Olsztyn. An 
increasing share of the land has been converted to housing land, reducing traditional agricultural 
landscapes and changing species compositions. Land conversion has been driven by several fac-
tors: the privatization of previous state farm land and expansion of private rights over land, an 
increasing demand for cheap land by people from Warsawa and Olsztyn, unprofitable market 
conditions for agricultural products, the desire to attract non-agricultural employment opportuni-
ties, and the hope for infrastructure improvements. County governments, empowered under the 
policy of fiscal and administrative decentralization, have displayed little interest to limit conver-
sion, as they expect to gain higher tax revenues after conversion. 
 
Romania: Irrigation management has fallen into disarray in Manastirea commune in the southern 
part of the country. Land had been privatized in 1991 already, but water resources and irrigation 
infrastructure had remained under the control of the state irrigation company. People established 
an agricultural cooperative to work the land, but it did not get involved in water management. 
The situation changed recently, when the state irrigation company was dissolved. With support 
by the World Bank, people now want to establish a water user association for irrigation manage-
ment. 
 
Source: Central and Eastern European Sustainable Agriculture (CEESA), Humboldt University 
Berlin, 2001 
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6 Bridging the Gap between Politics and People  
Matching institutions (i.e., rules, norms, rights, duties and competencies, and also ar-
rangements, organisations, networks and procedures) between different scales is an es-
sential prerequisite for sustainability based on the notion of co-evolution between eco-
logical and social systems (see also Constanza et al., 2001). For this reason, social capi-
tal and public participation alone cannot contribute to achieving agri-environmental 
sustainability in CEECs. Building a linkage between politics and people requires initia-
tives from both sides (Picture 2). Merely supporting large-scale commercial farming 
sectors and central bureaucracies in the candidate countries, as it is largely addressed by 
the EU-SAPARD structural measures appears to be insufficient (Lowe, 2000). Present 
rural unemployment and low standards of living in rural areas in CEECs are unlikely to 
dissolve by these measures. The goals of multifunctional and sustainable agricultures in 
CEECs cannot be achieved without investing into rural development and its social in-
frastructure. What is needed are a range of grassroots-oriented rural development pro-
grammes, including the encouragement of diversified farming, agri-tourism, crafts and 
micro-businesses, training and extension, information and networking, and agri-
environmental organisations and services. This requires capacity building, institutional 
development and opportunities for learning by doing. Only under these circumstances 
people will sufficiently benefit from rural development programmes and thereby be 
equipped to compete in an open market after accession (Lowe, 2000).  
 
The path towards sustainability by linking politics and citizens needs to be taken from 
both sides. On the one side, people are asked to mobilise creative forces by self-
governance and participation. The area around the village of Hostetin in the White Car-
pathians, Czech Republic serves as a good example: different groups of society have 
come together to nurture a broad range of small-scale local initiatives. Initiatives have 
focused on developing local economies, like juice production from locally grown apples 
or dry fruit and jam production. Other examples of initiatives are: sewage waste treat-
ment in reed-bed treatment plants, organic agriculture, or the re-introduction of the tra-
dition of sheep grazing and  a variety of cultural activities (Beckman, 2000; 2001). 
 
Such activities, however, strongly rely on cooperation between a range of different part-
ners stretching from local to international levels. Without the support from district offi-
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cials, ministries, research and business organisations and NGOs such projects will be 
difficult to put into practice. From this example, the benefits from investing in social 
capital are evident. 
 
Picture 2: Bridging the Gap between Politics and People Requires Involvement of  
Citizens and Politicians 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, government is expected to implement appropriate rural development 
programmes and measures, as it is undertaken in Slovenia, where the government rec-
ognises the multiple functions of agriculture and supports Codes of Good Agricultural 
Practice and environmentally friendly farming practices. Here, sustainable agricultural 
policies are characterised by agri-environmental measures, de-coupled production pay-
ments for controlled measures (e.g., controlled use of fertilisers and pesticides), and 
investments in rural development programmes. However, essential for success is the 
integration of rural development policies and the coordination among different sectors, 
local communities and the state (Majcen, 2001). Similar to the network of actors and 
initiatives from different levels in the Czech example, and the success of private farm 
managers with good contacts, networking is regarded an absolute necessity for main-
taining cultural identity and natural resources towards sustainability in an age of global-
isation and trade liberalisation. 
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Crafting policies in Brussels and in the national capitals of the accession countries is an 
important task. Nevertheless, these policies are sentenced to failure if crafting institu-
tions with local involvement is not given as much importance. Bridging the gap be-
tween politics and people also means knowing the local circumstances for which poli-
cies are made and allowing for institutional choice. Who is eligible to make decisions? 
What actions are allowed or constrained? What procedures must be followed? What 
information must be provided or not? What payoffs and costs are assigned to people’s 
actions? All these questions require rules in use known by everybody using them - rules 
which permit or forbid and are actually used, monitored and enforced when individuals 
make choices about actions they will take (Ostrom, 1992). Such institutions, rules which 
relate to people’s everyday lives and work, are essential because they shape human be-
haviour through their impact on incentives. 
 
To offer farmers appropriate incentives is crucial for policies to be effective. Incentives 
are more than just financial rewards and penalties. They are positively or negatively 
perceived and expected changes in outcomes resulting from particular actions. On the 
one hand, incentives stem from perceived technological means for farming activities 
(machines, inputs, etc.). On the other hand, incentives origin from individual as well as 
commonly held cultural values and shared mental models that people assign to certain 
actions and outcomes. Appropriate incentives must be able to ‘touch’ these sources of 
incentives because they lie at the heart of what motivates people. Appropriate incentives 
therefore need to be able to relate or to enhance the farmer’s pride, e.g., by promoting 
them to ‘stewards of the land’, acknowledging the public services they provide in one 
way or another. Farmers and the rural population need to be given the feeling that their 
participation can actually ‘make a difference’. Image, prestige, power or other opportu-
nities to make oneself distinct from others; satisfaction in social relationships, desirable 
working conditions and sufficient incomes are other examples for where to invest in 
adequate incentives (some of these traditions and experiences may have been forgotten 
to hastily after transition). Changes in formal institutions therefore do not automatically 
lead to changes in rules for everyday use, and they certainly do not need to lead to cor-
responding changes in incentives. Without knowing how formal rules and regulations 
from ‘above’ are perceived by people working on and living from the land and without 
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knowing how they fit into the specificity of the local social and economic context, poli-
cies have little chances to be useful. 
 
What does ‘bridging the gap between politics and people’ mean in the context of the 
CAP and its environmental reforms? In a short term perspective it appears as if the re-
form of agricultural policies is primarily about shifting funds from the first to the newly 
created second pillar of the CAP. However the institutional consequences go far be-
yond. Bridging the gap between politics and people requires not only policy instruments 
to integrate the environment into the CAP but also new institutions for policy formation 
and implementation (Hagedorn, 2001a; Hagedorn et al., 2001b). The difficulties of deal-
ing with these CAP reforms are illustrated by the example of cross-compliance (see 
below). 
 
It is well-known that sustainable rural infrastructures require appropriate institutional 
arrangements. But how do these governance structures need to be designed? Where and 
at which level are different kinds of governance structures useful, and where do they 
tend to have adverse effects on the environment? Empirical evidence shows that blue-
prints or universal rules for optimal institutional design mechanisms are less useful. 
Instead, design principles which recognise the features and functions of social and eco-
logical systems of each specific situation can be applied. These design principles refer 
to the question of how people can best be organised to achieve desirable outcomes. Siy 
(1982) identified following design principles: 
- Incentives and sanctions are needed to promote long-term participation and in-
volvement in group tasks in order to avoid ‘free riding’. 
- The commitment of the group members can be maintained if individual obliga-
tion is assigned in proportion to benefits derived by each member from the 
group activity. 
- Organisational principles need to be practicable according to certain types of 
physical arrangements (e.g., maximum decentralisation is not feasible within a 
system that requires close coordination between sub-units). 
- Adequate procedures for assigning and assessing members’ contributions need 
to be found. 
- The group needs to be able to generate the resources which it requires for its 
continued operations. These resources include direct inputs for providing the 
good or service and resources required to enforce agreements, procedures and 
regulations. 
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Farmers provide and produce different private goods, but also public goods. Which in-
stitutional arrangements serve best to maintain and acknowledge such provision and 
production activities? Whereas much thought has been put into the question of how to 
arrange production activities, far less is known about how to finance the operation, 
maintenance and monitoring of public goods or services. Financially, acknowledging 
for these provisions is complicated by the nature of the goods and services being pro-
vided collectively. NGOs must rely on the user’s willingness to pay for financing these 
services and governments can utilise the instrument of direct payments or taxation. 
Which payment vehicle will be best suited remains open to debate. However, this aspect 
should not be over-emphasized as money is just one of several other important incen-
tives for the agricultural community to invest into the valuable agri-environments of 
CEECs. Experiences with privatisation in transition countries have shown that transition 
towards a sustainable economy and ecology requires more than just private ownership 
of land (see section 3). 
 
Changing agricultural policies come along with implications for institutional change. A 
major characteristic of the transition process in all CEE countries is the change from a 
highly centralised to a decentralised system. The centralistically designed systems of the 
socialist era created a substantial lacuna in effective organisation. Social capital, local 
knowledge and experience about how to get things accomplished that require collective 
action had been replaced by directives, rules and default values – nevertheless they 
played a very important role in the system’ niches. People developed skills in serving 
the system and circumventing it. The frequent success stories of the fulfilment of pro-
duction targets in socialist times somehow resembles the frequent reports of successful 
compliance with EU directives. While certainly lacking well-grounded evidence this 
comparison wants to highlight the mismatch of institutions between the previously men-
tioned bottom-up initiatives and public participation and the current practice of top-
down EU policies.  
 
A current political example already mentioned above may illustrate this mismatch. The 
big hope connected to cross-compliance is that distributional and environmental objec-
tives could be achieved by one policy, by adding new (environmental) objectives to the 
already existing instrument of direct payments. As direct payments - introduced as a 
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temporary compensation for the positive income effects lost by the reduction of price 
support - can no longer be justified in the long run, obviously this solution serves the 
purposes of the political actors best as it provides new legitimisation to an old instru-
ment (Hagedorn, 2001a; Hagedorn et al., 2001b). However, whereas direct income 
transfers are easily organised in a centralist and hierarchical way, decision-making on 
environmental standards8 require decentralised approaches. Therefore, implementation 
of environmental standards require new mechanisms of administration, monitoring and 
control, participation, conflict resolution and learning. As the appropriate institutions for 
these tasks cannot be known beforehand, the design of and the choice between different 
institutional arrangements has to be considered as a part of the process. This again re-
quires sufficient scope of action for the evolution of new institutions instead of only 
shifting competencies within existing institutional structures (the federal system) from 
higher to lower levels. This example shows that there are organisational tasks which can 
be efficiently handled centralistically (e.g., direct payments as an element of agricultural 
incomes policy) and others which require polycentric structures (e.g., integrating the 
environment into the CAP). Obviously, it is a relevant question at which scale institu-
tionalisation and organisation should take place?  
 
Another example refers to the speed of legislative harmonisation with the EU environ-
mental acquis and the level of formal compliance. Although this differs from one CEE 
country to another, in all these countries new environmental legislation has been or is 
being passed in order partly to signify a break from the past pattern of overly detailed 
legislation combined with ineffective implementation, and partly to bring legislation 
into line with EU norms, in anticipation of future EU membership (Caddy, 1997; Zellei, 
2001). The process of establishing environmental legal systems in CEE countries 
showed that environmental legislation played a more political rather than substantial 
role in the process of legislative approximation. The government role was decisive in 
creating and implementing legal acts, while the public was deprived of its role to influ-
ence and participate. Public support, understanding and willingness to comply with the 
enacted regulations were not seen as important in creating an effective legal system. 
Establishing environmental regulations was not necessary to ensure immediate im-
                                                 
8Cross compliance means that direct payments are made conditional upon social and environmental crite-
ria/standards.  
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provement of economic entities, but rather to fulfil intellectual wishes and political 
needs (REC, 1996). Accordingly, they were usually not supplemented with effective 
implementation mechanisms. The implementation and enforcement of existing law con-
tinues to be a major concern in the CEECs (Zellei, 2001).  
7 Conclusions 
During the process of transition and accession towards sustainable agri-environments 
there are several relations which are important to consider and which we have character-
ised in this paper. These relations are between 
- ecosystems and social systems  
in general and can be subdivided into relations between 
- people, their institutions (rules in use, governance structures) and agro-
ecosystems 
- national policies, politics and people in CEE countries 
- EU policies, people and agro-ecosystems in CEE countries 
 
As social and ecological systems are intrinsically interwoven, shaping sustainable agri-
environments requires taking these relations and their interactions into account. Institu-
tions of sustainability evolve at the interface between social and ecological systems. 
These kind of institutions are largely rules in use or working rules with which people 
organise every day practices for agri-environmental resource management problems 
such as managing irrigation and drainage systems, or maintaining biodiversity on grass-
lands. Allowing for the evolution and co-adaptation of institutions to actual resource 
management problems is essential as we do not know beforehand which institutions are 
most appropriate for specific resource problems. But co-adaptation also occurs within 
the complexity of social systems. The privatisation experience during transition in many 
CEECs has shown that the social, legal, political and economical embeddedness of 
property relations have often been overlooked.  
 
As institutions, especially those at the embeddedness level (norms, values, shared men-
tal models), change slowly, building institutions of sustainability is a complex task 
which requires time, even more under the simultaneous influence of transition. The 
transition process in CEE countries has particular affects on the process of institution 
building and it is questionable whether the task of building institutions of sustainability 
is given sufficient importance. E.g., it can be observed that there is a high incentive in-
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tensity for institutional change regarding the distribution of private property rights but 
property rights on ecological attributes of the nature components are often duties caus-
ing negative income effects. Similarly, governance structures for making effective non-
private property rights related to sustainable resource use and agri-environmental sus-
tainability is much more difficult and costly to achieve and therefore they are often ne-
glected causing adverse impacts on the environment. 
 
Although the legal framework for public participation is set in all CEE countries and 
although there is a potential of public concern about environmental matters and poten-
tials of social capital in CEECs, there remains a gap between legislation and practice 
which can partly be explained by lacking experience in public participation and partly 
by lacking systems and procedures for informing the general public about government 
decisions. Substantial investments into social and human capital are still needed. 
 
The enlargement process in general and the process of adopting the aquis communitaire 
is an additional task which is given high priority. However, these policies are sentenced 
to failure if crafting institutions with local involvement is not given as much impor-
tance. Bridging the gap between politics and people means acknowledging the local 
circumstances for which policies are made and allowing for institutional choice (from 
bottom-up). Institutions are required which are known by everybody using them. In the 
context of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU and its shift from the first to the 
second pillar (Greening the CAP) it appears as if politicians merely seek new policy 
instruments but forget that these are likely to be ineffective without enforcement and 
implementation mechanisms which require appropriate institutional design. The exam-
ple of cross-compliance shows that the difference between the provision and production 
of private goods is different from that of non-private environmental goods and services.  
 
The evolution of institutions of sustainability is a far more complex and challenging 
task than initially thought, especially under transition and accession. In order to cope 
with the challenges we have shown the importance of institutions of sustainability and 
we have provided a framework for understanding, analysis and empirical evidence for 
the requirements needed to achieve this kind of institutional building. Last but not least 
achieving sustainability requires further positive analysis. In order to learn which im-
Gatzweiler and Hagedorn – The Evolution of Institutions in Transition 
 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEESA) 35 
Discussion Paper 
pacts selected policies will have on the environment, we need to know more about the 
actual conditions and the people who deal with specific resource management problems.  
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